Find vulnerabilities before attackers do.

AI-powered audits that map your architecture, validate findings across multiple models, and verify exploitability — not just flag patterns. First audit free.

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Built for Solidity teams shipping on EVM

Architecture-first

System understanding

Hours, not weeks

Typical 1–3 h

Multi-model

Consensus validation

Exploit-verified

Proof of concept

OverviewArchitectureExploits
b4e9a2fMar 21scanning
3critical
7high
17medium
7low
2info

Unchecked external callback before balance update

reentrancy·Vault
validatedVault.solcritical

Admin rotation bypasses timelock constraint

access control·Governor
validatedGovernor.solhigh

Oracle staleness window exceeds safe threshold

price manipulation·PriceFeed
validatedPriceFeed.solhigh

Unchecked transfer return value hides failure

best practice·Treasury
Treasury.solmedium

Missing zero-address check on initialization

best practice·Proxy
validatedProxy.sollow

Auditing contracts across

Ethereum
Arbitrum
Optimism
Base
Polygon

Validated findings

Every finding comes with code, context, and multi-model confidence.

Findings include severity, file location, Solidity code snippets, and validation confidence from multiple models. Not vague descriptions — actionable signals.

Finding detailowner/vault-core

Unchecked external callback before balance update

The withdraw function calls an external contract before updating internal state, enabling reentrant calls to drain funds.

Vault.sollines 142–158
function withdraw(uint256 amount) external {
  require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount);
  // ⚠ external call before state update
  token.transfer(msg.sender, amount);
  balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
}

Severity

critical

Risk type

security bug

Confidence

high

Status

validated

Component

Vault.sol

Exploit verificationowner/vault-core
terminal
$guardix exploit --task 1 --fork mainnet
Forking mainnet at block 19,842,116...
Deploying FlawVerifier.sol to scratch chain
Executing reentrancy exploit on Vault.withdraw()
Exploit verified — drained 142.8 ETH from Vault

Task result

exploit verified

Reentrancy on Vault.withdraw()

Agent drained 142.8 ETH via recursive callback before balance update on forked mainnet.

Chain

mainnet fork

Verifier

FlawVerifier.sol

Exploit pipeline

Findings backed by proof-of-concept exploits.

Critical findings are verified against a forked chain. If the exploit executes, you know it's real — not a false positive. Automated, reproducible, and verifiable.

Architecture context

Invariants, assumptions, and decisions — not just a list of bugs.

The audit maps the system architecture before looking for issues. Findings are grounded in what the contracts are supposed to do, not just what they technically allow.

Architecture artifactsowner/vault-core
INV-001state

Total supply must equal sum of individual balances at all times

Threat if broken

Direct loss of depositor funds

INV-002ordering

Queue state transitions must be monotonic: pending → processing → done

Threat if broken

Double-processing of withdrawals

INV-003external

Oracle price feeds assumed fresh within 1-hour staleness window

Threat if broken

Incorrect liquidation at stale prices

INV-004access

Admin role changes cannot bypass timelock constraints

Threat if broken

Unauthorized privilege escalation

How it works

From pinned commit to a report you can defend.

One reproducible snapshot in; architecture context, tightened findings, and proof where severity demands it. Select a stage to read what happens there.

When a pipeline step is focused, use arrow keys to move between stages. Home and End jump to the first or last stage.

Stage 01

Pin your snapshot

Lock to the exact branch and commit you plan to ship.

stonevault/vault-core
maina3f8c1dMar 6, 2026
Snapshot locked — all artifacts trace to this commit
42 .sol files·6 interfaces·3 libraries

Positioning

First line of defense. Not a replacement.

Guardix maps your architecture, runs broad parallel analysis with multiple independent models, and verifies critical findings with exploit proof of concepts. Use the remaining budget for novel attack vectors that require human judgment.

Read the full comparison →
Guardix vs manual auditowner/vault-core
GuardixManual audit
Time to results1–3 hours2–4 weeks
Cost per audit$200$50,000+
Issue coverageBroad, multi-modelComprehensive
Output formatInteractive dashboardPDF report
Re-audit cycleSame-day on new commitNew engagement

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